How Selling for $8M Can Mean Selling an $8M Business for $8M
The Mistake
Founders see an 8-figure exit headline and assume the seller won. Tibo Louis-Lucas sold Tweet Hunter and Taplio for $2M upfront with an earnout that closed at $8M total. Public number: $8M exit. Reality: he publicly regrets selling.
The mistake is structuring a high-earnout deal during the fastest growth phase of a SaaS business and not pricing in what the company will be worth by the time the earnout closes.
Tibo's framing is brutal: "We basically ended up selling an 8 million company for 8 million."
Why Founders Make It
Three pressures push founders into bad earnout math.
The number sounds great today. A $1.5M ARR business getting an offer "up to $10M" feels like a 6-7x ARR exit. Founders anchor on the headline. They do not model what their ARR will be at month 18.
Acquirers know your growth curve better than you do. Lempire (the buyer) was already in the audience tooling space. They could see Tweet Hunter's trajectory. The earnout structure transferred most of the upside to them while making it look like Tibo would "earn" it.
The fear of giving back the gains. After 250K euros of personal debt and two failed startups, the upfront $2M felt like life-changing money. Saying no felt like greed. The asymmetry between "guaranteed $2M now" and "uncertain $10M+ in 2 years" pulls founders toward the smaller, certain number.
The flawed reasoning: "We grow into the earnout." Yes. And then the earnout caps the price at the lower revenue you had when you signed.
How Tibo Sold an $8M Business for $8M
Timeline of the deal:
- At signing: Tweet Hunter + Taplio doing roughly $1.5M ARR. Deal: $2M upfront, up to $10M based on 6 milestones over 18 months.
- At earnout end (18 months later): Doing $8M ARR. Hit 5 of 6 milestones. Total payout: $8M.
- Effective multiple: 1x ARR on the business at exit. A SaaS business growing 5x in 18 months should not sell at 1x ARR.
Tibo: "We grew like crazy. We grew five times during those 18 months. And so we basically ended up selling an 8 million company for 8 million."
The emotional cost was bigger. After the earnout: "You really have nothing to do. You have this big void, like this big emptiness." He calls it post-exit depression. He is now back to building, running TMAKER from scratch as a way to fill the void recognition didn't fill.
The Fix (If You're Making It Now)
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Price the earnout against your projected ARR at earnout close, not today's ARR. If you grow 3x in 18 months, your earnout cap should equal a fair multiple of that future ARR, not today's. Do the math before signing.
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Negotiate a revenue-based ratchet, not a fixed-milestone ceiling. Fixed milestones cap your upside. A revenue ratchet means the more you grow, the more you earn, with no ceiling.
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Keep optionality open. If you can stay independent (raise from a strategic, take a recap, or just keep running it), do that for 12 more months and revisit. Tibo's view: "What we did with them, we could have done on our own."
The Signal to Watch
If you are signing a 2-year earnout while your ARR is doubling every 6 months, you are likely selling at the wrong price. Run this check: what would this same business be worth in 18 months at your current growth rate? If the earnout cap is below that number, walk away.
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